Illegal casino mirrors — when the fight is no longer about a single domain, but an entire infrastructure

Ukrainian internet service providers have once again, at the regulator’s request, restricted access to hundreds of websites offering illegal gambling services. However, the figure of “475 websites” alone says little until one looks at what exactly makes up this list. It is not a random collection of individual casinos, but rather an extensive network of mirrors and technical addresses built around several well-known brands. This is the defining feature of modern shadow gambling, both globally and in Ukraine. Tackling it has long ceased to be a matter of simply blocking “one bad website.”

The National Commission for the State Regulation of Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum and the Provision of Postal Services (NCEC) has ordered internet service providers to restrict access to 475 websites offering illegal gambling. Formally, this is yet another decision in a long series of similar blocking measures. However, the structure of the list deserves particular attention.

The lion’s share of the list, 268 domains, consists of addresses associated with the GetX brand. These are not simply copies of a single website: dozens of combinations such as “casino,” “vip,” “game,” or “zerkalo” are added to the main name, along with hyphenated versions and variations in letter combinations. Another 37 domains belong to the Vavada network, which operates according to a similar model. In total, the names make it possible to identify at least 14 different brands. More than 150 addresses have random alphanumeric names, making it impossible to determine their affiliation based solely on the domain. This in itself points to a deliberate attempt to obscure the trail from regulators and mislead players. It is also telling that the overwhelming majority of these websites are registered under the same top-level domain - life - indicating an almost “assembly-line” approach to registering new addresses.

It is also important to understand how the decision-making process works. Formally, access restrictions are approved by the state agency PlayCity, after which the NCEC communicates the requirement to internet service providers, which are responsible for technically blocking access at their level. In other words, the regulator does not act randomly or manually on a case-by-case basis, but through an established administrative chain: PlayCity makes the decision, the NCEC forwards the list, and internet providers implement the requirement.

When an illegal gambling operator’s primary domain is blocked, the operator rarely disappears. Instead, a new address usually emerges within days or even hours, most often with a modified letter, an additional word, or under a new domain extension. A player looking for a familiar brand simply follows the new link, and for them, effectively nothing changes apart from the URL itself. This is precisely why the fight against illegal gambling can no longer be limited to targeted blocking of individual addresses, it must be systematic and involve “network-level” blocking.

This requires continuous monitoring of new mirror sites, analysis of patterns in domain names and the domain extensions being used, as well as speed in the enforcement process itself. The more quickly PlayCity makes a decision and internet providers implement it, the less time an illegal operator has to operate under a new address. In this sense, each new large-scale blocking action is not a one-off measure, but part of a longer process aimed at “compressing” the shadow ecosystem surrounding several major brands.

Experience shows that the illegal market responds to regulatory pressure quite quickly: new mirror sites emerge almost immediately after previous ones are blocked. This means that isolated measures, even when implemented on a large scale, are not sufficient to solve the problem once and for all. Rather, the issue requires a continuous, recurring cycle based on interagency cooperation and collaboration between regulators and legitimate businesses. Each such cycle narrows the room for manoeuvre available to illegal operators, making their operations more technically and financially difficult. It is precisely this regularity that constitutes the real effectiveness of the fight against shadow gambling in Ukraine.

At the same time, a model in which the legal segment remains visible, transparent, and operates under clear, verified rules is gradually becoming a more competitive alternative.